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Trust Us…We’re the FBI
Benjamin Shimp
Ben is a junior majoring in criminal justice. 
This paper was written as part of a criminal 
justice course he took in Fall 007 under 
the instruction of Prof. Richard Wright. At 
this point in his academic career, he is still 
deciding on a career path but enjoys the 
study of American civil liberties.
On September 11, 2001, the United States of America was attacked by terrorist operatives causing one of the worst acts of terrorism known to date.  In an effort to prevent these types of occurrences from happening in our country, the Uniting and Strengthening of 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act was passed by Congress in October of 2001. 
Since then many wiretap and surveillance programs have been put into place, 
and many older provisions such as the National Security Letter have gained 
strength.  However, along with increased safety efforts many liberties and 
freedoms afforded to Americans have been restricted and compromised as a 
result.
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), a National Security 
Letter (NSL) is a letter requesting “…information from a third party that is 
issued by the FBI or by other government agencies with authority to conduct 
national security investigations” (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], n.d.). 
The authority of the NSL is provided by five provisions of the United States 
Code. First, the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5), allows 
NSLs to obtain financial institution customer records (FBI, n.d.).  Second, the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681u(a) and (b), permits disclosure on a 
list of financial institution identities and consumer identifying information from 
a credit reporting company (FBI, n.d.).  Third, amendments to the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681v, (under the USA PATRIOT Act) allow disclosure 
of a full credit report on individuals believed to be involved in an international 
terrorism case (FBI, n.d.).  Fourth, the Electronics Communications Privacy 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2709, provides billing and transactional communication service 
providers records from telephone companies and internet service providers (FBI, 
n.d.).  And finally, the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 436, obtains financial, 
consumer, and travel records on certain government employees who have 
access to classified information (FBI, n.d.).  In simple terms, NSLs allow the FBI 
and other government agencies to gather personal financial and transactional 
information on residents in the United States.
 
Historically, NSLs were only used on foreign residents residing in America.  Since 
9/11 and the subsequent USA PATRIOT Act, President Bush’s administration 
transformed NSLs essentially permitting disclosure of records on any United 
States resident (foreign or domestic) (Gellman, 2005; Johnston & Lipton, 2007). 
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While this may seem harsh, it has become one of the primary 
methods of gathering intelligence information to generate 
possible links to terrorism and terrorist plots.  A method such 
as this proactive approach was scrutinized because of criticisms 
that the FBI received from being unable to prevent the terrorist 
attacks in 2001 (Gellman, 2005; Washington Post, 2006).  Thus, 
the Bush administration and the FBI believed the NSL was 
necessary to obstruct terrorism.
According to the FBI (n.d.), there are only two restrictions or 
limitations placed on NSLs.  First, they are only available for 
authorized national security investigations (i.e., international 
terrorism or foreign intelligence/counter-intelligence 
investigations), not general criminal investigations or domestic 
terrorism investigations (FBI, n.d.).  And second, an NSL can only 
be used to seek transactional information permitted under the 
five NSL provisions (FBI, n.d.). 
A NSL cannot be used to acquire content within the transaction, 
only the information that the transaction exists.  For example, 
a NSL cannot be used to authorize eavesdropping on telephone 
communications or reading the contents of an e-mail.  But it 
allows government agencies to trace the paths of communication 
between the telephone calls and the e-mails.  Essentially, the 
government can obtain records on how a person makes and 
spends money, what he/she buys, where he/she travels, what he/
she reads on the Internet, who telephones or e-mails him/her at 
home or at work, etc.  The letters have typically been used to 
trace the financial transactions of military personnel, but have 
also largely been used to investigate civilian contractors as well 
(Lichtblau & Mazzetti, 2007).
While the NSL seems like a viable method in catching terrorists 
and disrupting planned operations, it is not a practical use of 
resources, and it violates the First and Fourth Amendments of the 
U.S. Constitution which guarantees citizens rights and freedoms 
in the United States.  Therefore, a citizen, whether foreign or 
domestic, who is within the United States should not be required 
to turn over any documentation if he/she is a recipient of a NSL.
Under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, “The right of 
the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized” 
(The National Archives, n.d.).  The NSL is much like a warrant or 
subpoena seeking particular information (such as bank statements, 
telephone records, etc.), but it fails to support the provisions of 
probable cause.  When the NSL was created in 1986 as part of 
the Electronics Communication Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2709, it 
was utilized as an investigative tool to monitor for terrorism and 
terrorist activity.  However, because of the attack on the World 
Trade Center in 2001, it is being used more loosely as a fishing 
tool to acquire as much information as possible on thousands 
of innocent people simply because they use a specific Internet 
Service Provider or a certain telephone company (Savage, 2007). 
According to the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General 
(OIG), an underestimated 143,000 NSLs were issued between 
2003 and 2005, and annually there has been a fivefold increase in 
letters since 2001 (Fine, 2007; Smith, 2007).  Staggering numbers 
such as these show ‘hunches’ rather than probable cause, because 
it is not probable that there is an excess of 143,000 United States 
citizens who wish to commit an act of terrorism. 
Before the USA PATRIOT Act, an NSL could only be used if it 
had “specific and articulable facts [(e.g. probable cause)] giving 
reason to believe that the customer or entity whose records are 
sought [was] a foreign power or agent of a foreign power” (Fine, 
2007).  However, after the USA PATRIOT Act this requirement 
was amended allowing NSLs to obtain information on any person 
so long as it is relevant to a national security investigation (Fine, 
2007; Lichtblau & Mazzetti, 2007).  The amended requirement is 
so broad that the FBI can construe practically anything as being 
a national security investigation, which makes the NSL limitless. 
Also, after the USA PATRIOT Act, issuance of NSLs was 
broadened.  Previously, NSLs were issued by a limited number 
of senior FBI Headquarters officials, but new provisions allowed 
Special Agents in Charge of the FBI’s 56 field offices to sign and 
approve NSLs for use, greatly expanding approval authority (Fine, 
2007).
Furthermore, according to its own provisions, the NSL is not 
“supported by oath or affirmation,” rather it is issued by FBI 
personnel without judicial oversight (The National Archives, 
n.d.).  This could cause significant abuses of power because of 
inadequate checks and balances.  In a report issued on March 
28, 2007, Inspector General Glenn Fine testified that during the 
period from 2003 to 2005 (3 years), out of 143,000 NSLs only 26 
violations were found by the FBI. 
The violations included “the issuance of NSLs without proper 
authorization, improper requests under the statutes cited in the 
NSLs, and unauthorized collection of telephone or Internet e-mail 
transactional records” (Fine, 2007).  Unfortunately, in the OIG’s 
review of only 293 NSLs, 22 violations had not been reported 
or identified by the FBI (Fine, 2007).  This is very unsettling 
because OIG found 22 violations out of 293 NSLs whereas the 
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FBI reports 26 violations out of an excess of 143,000 NSLs.  But 
while these violations found by the OIG were believed to have 
been a result from FBI agents’ confusion and unfamiliarity with 
NSL constraints and not abuse, many, if not all of the violations 
would not have occurred if judicial oversight existed in approving 
an NSL.
Additionally, this report found problems under the Fourth 
Amendment with “exigent letters,” or letters that request 
information immediately because of emergency circumstances. 
These letters were not part of the NSL authority and were not 
NSLs.  However, they were used to obtain subscriber information 
from three telephone companies whose impression was that the 
FBI had NSLs being constructed for them (which was true). 
The NSL, however, would not arrive until months later because 
the FBI needed to “cover” itself from being able to explain how 
intelligence information was obtained legally (Fine, 2007).  Often, 
it was found that these exigent letters were authorized and signed 
by FBI personnel who were not authorized to sign NSLs, making 
them non-legal binding documents.  And according to OIG, their 
review found that many times the “exigent letters” were used in 
non-emergency situations to begin with (Fine, 2007).
Under the First Amendment in our Constitution, people are 
guaranteed that “Congress shall make no law…abridging the 
freedom of speech or of the press” (The National Archives, n.d.). 
Within the provisions of a NSL there is a clause that places a gag 
order on the letter, prohibiting its re,cipient from ever speaking 
about it (18 U.S.C. 2709(c) [2006]).  Original provisions to the 
NSL prohibited its recipients from challenging the letter in 
court.  However, after the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 3511 (2006), amendments 
to judicial review were inserted into the USA PATRIOT Act 
allowing the United States district courts to “…petition for an 
order modifying or setting aside the request” (18 U.S.C § 3511 
[2006]).  This decision came after the 2004 case of John Doe 
versus John Ashcroft (Marrero, 2007).
In this particular case, John Doe, an internet service provider, 
received an NSL to disclose records from customers using their 
services.  After refusing, Doe challenged the letter claiming its 
unconstitutionality under the gag order provision.  In September 
2004, Judge Victor Marrero struck down NSL provisions of the 
USA PATRIOT Act saying that permanent gag orders violated 
free speech rights protected under the First Amendment.  The 
government appealed the ruling, but Congress amended the 
NSL provision (through the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act) before the court could issue a decision 
(American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], 2007).  Essentially, had 
Congress not passed the bill, the NSL would probably have been 
declared unconstitutional, thus prohibiting its use.
However, the new provisions, which allow limited judicial review 
(only challenging) are still unconstitutional.  The NSL still violates 
the First Amendment by “giving the FBI authority to suppress 
speech without prior judicial review” (ACLU, 2007).  While the 
amended statute allows recipients to challenge gag orders in 
district court, the NSL provision requires that the courts defer to 
the FBI’s view that secrecy is necessary (ACLU, 2007).  But, this 
defeats the purpose of judicial review and checks and balances if 
discretion is solely limited to the FBI. 
While one can understand the expeditious process and speediness 
of the NSL as a tool, it should not be utilized if it violates the First 
and Fourth Amendments.  There should be a balance between 
civil liberties and investigative methods, however, the NSL does 
not provide an adequate balance and draws supreme power to 
the Executive branch.  Rather, instead of using an NSL perhaps it 
would be more prudent to use something similar to the original 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1801 
(2006), however, maintain the intelligence information that an 
NSL obtains (i.e., transactional records rather that complete 
surveillance as the FISA does).  This way prior judicial consent 
would be required in order to lawfully collect data on suspects. 
Under FISA-like provisions, the courts must find probable cause 
and minimization requirements to justify surveillance. Moreover, 
problems with the First Amendment will cease to exist because 
the FISA requires no gag order for its recipients.  Overall, 
some speediness may be lost, but even more is being lost when 
companies refuse to hand over information because they believe 
the request to be unconstitutional.
Thus far, the documents that have been collected through the 
NSL have not found or established any links to terrorism or 
terrorist related planning (Lichtblau & Mazzetti, 2007; Gellman, 
2006).  And on September 6, 2007, the gag order on the NSL was 
declared unconstitutional under the First Amendment because 
“it functions as a licensing scheme that does not afford adequate 
procedural safeguards, and because it is not a sufficiently narrowly 
tailored restriction on protected speech” (Marrero, 2007). 
Because the courts determined that the subsection involving the 
gag order could not be separated from the rest of the statute, the 
entire NSL provision was declared unconstitutional barring an 
appeal within 90 days (Marrero, 2007).  This does not restrict 
the FBI from using the NSL within the extra 90 days, however, 
unless an appeal is filed the decision will uphold the statute as 
unconstitutional.
While there is no doubt that an appeal will be filed or amendments 
will be made to the existing NSL statute, one can only hope that 
new provisions will give American citizens proper civil liberties 
afforded by the U.S. Constitution.  As the battle continues to stop 
the War on Terrorism, we must not lose sight of maintaining 
liberty and order by keeping our methods of intelligence gathering 
fair and constitutional.
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